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Controlling what we see and do in complex
environments depends upon the interaction of top-
down control mechanisms located in the prefrontal
cortex, on the one hand, and bottom-up competition
between objects for limited perceptual resources in
posterior cortical areas, on the other.
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How do we control our perceptions and actions in a
complex world? This is a difficult, multifaceted question,
with a complexity commensurate with that of the world
we live in. But despite the inherent difficulties, the
problem is being confronted on a number of fronts.
Recent studies using a variety of approaches — recording
from the brains of awake, behaving monkeys, functional
imaging of human brain activity, and investigations into
the effects of brain lesions on human performance — have
improved our understanding of how the brain controls
what we see and do. 
Let us imagine a not uncommon real-life situation. You
want to go for a drive, but your car will not start. You know
nothing about cars. But nevertheless you get out, open the
bonnet and stare at the muddle of blocks, wires, tubes and
lumps which usually makes the thing go. But here is the
problem: what do you look at first? And do you do anything
to it? If so, what and how? Here the brain is faced with the
problem of control over what to see and do in the typically
complex environment that humans create for themselves.
How does it set about coping with this sort of puzzle?
In the first phase of bewilderment, you may just stare
blankly without plan or thought, leaving the scores of
objects filling your vision to engage in an undignified
struggle for selection as the object of your conscious
attention. In your passive state, you may end up staring at
the battery, which has won the competition simply by
virtue of being bright yellow in contrast to the dull grey of
the rest of the engine. Duncan’s theory of integrated com-
petition [1] argues that this strong differentiation by a
primary perceptual feature will strengthen the representa-
tions in the brain of all other features possessed by that
one object, such as shape, orientation and motion (the car
is rocking gently as you pound it with your fist...). Your
experience of attending to the yellow cuboid is an end-
product of competition by objects for neural resources —
in other words, visual attention is a state into which the
visual system settles. 
But others argue that, far from being an end-product,
attention is an active control process — the very glue
that binds together the elementary features, colour, ori-
entation, motion, and so on, which are separately
processed in distinct areas of the brain. In a complex
visual field, how does the yellowness of the battery
become linked to its shape, if these attributes are
processed in different areas of the brain? Why does not
the blackness of the distributor cap ‘attach’ itself to the
battery’s cuboid shape? In fact, such ‘illusory conjunc-
tions’ can happen, particularly when people are made to
maintain a diffuse spread of non-focussed attention to a
visual array while reporting the shape, size, colour or
shading of a designated object [2]. Without the ability to
spatially focus visual attention, features belonging to
separate objects ‘migrate’ and are erroneously reported
as being attributes of other objects — in effect the
battery is seen as being black. 
Such migration has been observed in a person suffering
bilateral lesions to the parietal cortex [3]. While this
person was well able to find a specified colour in a
complex visual array, or a specific shape, he had great dif-
ficulty in searching for objects specified by a combination
of two features — being red and circular, for example —
implicating the parietal cortices as the location of the
spatial attention needed to ‘glue’ these features together.
There is also support from functional brain imaging of
normal subjects for a role of the superior parietal cortex in
such a conjunction search. Corbetta et al. [4] found that
while searching for a stimulus defined by only colour or
motion did not activate superior parietal cortex, searching
for a stimulus defined by colour and motion together did
specifically activate these parietal areas.
The use of attention as a feature-binding mechanism
implies there is an item-by-item, serial search of complex
visual arrays in which targets are defined by combinations
of features. Visual search data show that each serial re-fixa-
tion must take tens of milliseconds, yet when visual
stimuli are presented rapidly and sequentially at a fixed
spatial location, the interference caused by target selection
lasts hundreds of milliseconds [5]. In other words, having
just stared hopelessly at the battery, it will take a few
hundred milliseconds before you can detach your atten-
tion from it in order to stare hopelessly at the distributor
cap. This ‘attentional blink’, if applied to the serial search
paradigms of Treisman, would result in conjunction search
times many times longer than those actually found. This
discrepancy remains to be resolved.
There is only so much that you can take in while staring at
the engine. Duncan [1] and Lavie [6], among many others,
argue that we have a limited perceptual capacity that
governs how much we can process visually. Lavie [6], in
particular, argues that all stimuli will be processed auto-
matically up until the limit set by a fixed perceptual
capacity. Under high perceptual load conditions (you are
straining your eyes to see whether there is any water in
the battery...) you will process less peripheral information
than under low-load conditions (you are back staring
hopelessly at the battery...). 
This hypothesis was elegantly supported in a positron
emission tomography (PET) study in which subjects
were given either a high-load or a low-load central task
involving monitoring words for predetermined targets [7].
Simultaneously, subjects were presented with a periph-
eral, radially-moving stimulus, known to activate the
visual motion brain area V5. If Lavie were right, then
with a high central perceptual load, V5 should not be
activated, as the peripheral stimuli causing its activation
would not be processed. This is precisely what was
found: only with the visually similar, but perceptually
less demanding, task was V5 activation found, indicating
that the peripheral moving stimulus had been processed
by the residual perceptual capacity only available in the
low-load condition.
Noticing the distributor cap, because you have given up
the high perceptual load task of peering into the battery
water, prompts you to think about other parts of the
engine. This triggers a vague memory about starter
motors, and you scan the engine with the help of a half-
remembered mental picture of what one looks like,
dredged from long-term memory. Now the competition
for your limited processing capacity begins again, but this
time the image of the starter motor held in working
memory in your frontal cortex biases the competition for
objects that approximate to the shape and location of the
starter motor. Such top-down biasing of the competition
between objects gives an advantage to objects that have
starter-motor-type features, which then more easily win
the race for awareness.
In macaque monkeys, attention to a target object increases
the firing rate of cells in the inferior temporal cortex that
are sensitive to that object [8]. You finally ‘see’ the starter
motor, therefore, because the cells that code for its
constituent features are firing more rapidly; when these
features cross the retina, suprathreshold detection and
competition-winning awareness of the object results. Had
you had no idea about the starter motor’s shape, but did
know its likely location, then the cells coding that location
could have been primed in a similar way, again resulting in
faster detection.
Starter motors sometimes jam, you suddenly remember.
Reaching for the hammer in the toolbox, your fingers shape
exquisitely to the handle’s precise diameter and orientation
just before making contact. This is because visual informa-
tion is made directly available to the motor system, infor-
mation which is unavailable to conscious awareness. We
know this, in part because of a patient whose brain damage
left her with a profound difficulty in perceiving and dis-
criminating simple shapes and orientations, yet who had a
normal ability to orient her hand when reaching to ‘post’ a
hand-held plaque through a slot placed at different orienta-
tions [9]. A network that includes the posterior parietal
cortex may be critical in the provision of direct visuo-motor
links for the control of complex actions in the environment,
unaccompanied by conscious awareness. Indeed, cells have
been located in the anterior part of the intraparietal sulcus
that are not selective for location, but are selective for spe-
cific visual stimuli, and firing of these cells is also associated
with particular motor acts, such as grasping [10]. 
You lift the hammer, tap the starter motor and switch on
the engine. It bursts delightfully into life. You leap into
the car and speed off to work. There is only one problem.
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Figure 1
A top-down view of the brain, showing areas of activation during a
sustained attention task, as revealed by a PET scan. This is one of
many findings showing that, during sustained attention to monotonous
tasks, there is preferential activation in the right hemisphere, in
particular in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (top right, arrow)
and right superior parietal cortex (bottom right, arrow). Reproduced
with permission from [13].
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You left your toolbox in the middle of the pavement.
Absent-mindedness in daily life is predicted by deficits in
sustaining attention on laboratory tests [11]. Solving any
non-trivial problem requires the capacity to sustain
attention to the task over extended periods, and this
ability resides in part in the right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex [12], and usually also in the superior parietal cortex
(Figure 1). Such common, everyday errors in the control of
behaviour reveal the complexities of the underlying
neural processes, which, although more clearly delineated
as a result of research over the last five years, are still
understood only to a limited degree. Using the combined
methodologies of functional imaging, experimental neu-
ropsychology and single-cell recording from awake, behav-
ing animals, however, this understanding will surely grow
substantially over the next decade. 
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If you found this dispatch interesting, you might also want
to read the August 1997 issue of
Current Opinion in
Neurobiology
which included the following reviews, edited
by Wolf Singer and Randall R Reed, on
Sensory systems:
Sensory hyperacuity in the jamming avoidance
response of weakly electric fish
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Insect visual perception: complex abilities of simple
nervous system
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Haim Sompolinsky and Robert Shapley
Mechanisms of visual object recognition: monkey 
and human studies
Keiji Tanaka
Learning perceptual skills: behavioral probes into adult
cortical plasticity
Avi Karni and Giuseppe Bertini
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new vistas on mechanisms
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Olfactory processing: maps, time and codes
Gilles Laurent
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Susan M Courtney and Leslie G Ungerleider
Parietal cortex: from sight to action
Giacomc Rizzolatti, Leonardo Fogassi 
and Vittorio Gallesse
The full text of Current Opinion in Neurobiology is in the
BioMedNet library at
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